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ABSTRACT
MARK YACOUB: Emotional Framing: How Do Emotions Contribute to
Framing Effects?
(Under the direction of Pamela J. Conover.)
A great deal of research has shown the ability of issue frames to affect individuals’
opinions on a variety of issues. In explaining these effects, however, researchers
have mainly focused on the cognitive processes behind framing, failing to system-
atically place emotions in the framing process. Frames, though, often rely upon
emotional appeals and can be designed to elicit specific emotional reactions. How
exactly do these emotions operate to influence framing effects? To address this
question, I propose a theory of emotional intensity as a crucial part of the framing
process—the intensity of emotional reactions to a frame influence how important
beliefs brought up by the frame are viewed, affecting subsequent opinions. I test
my specific expectations with an experiment using emotional news articles based
on two issues. I conclude with a discussion of my results, the potential drawbacks
and limitations of my experimental design, and directions for future research.
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Introduction
Interest in framing has grown because of its implications for political commu-
nication, behavior, and public policy. Framing theory is built on the premise that
the way an issue is presented influences how people perceive it. Years of research
have, in fact, confirmed that frames do shape citizen opinions (Iyengar 1991; Zaller
1992; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997). In explaining these effects, researchers
have mainly focused on the cognitive processes behind framing, when it occurs,
and its impact on citizens. However, we know little about how emotions fit into
the framing process, a limitation this paper aims to address.
Early research documented framing effects on many issues, leading researchers
to believe that framing effects were ubiquitous. If elites could use framing to
alter the beliefs and opinions of ordinary citizens, what were the implications
for deliberative democracy and the competency of those who elect our national
leaders? While early research suggested that citizens passively accept frames from
elites and the media that influence their views (Nelson and Kinder 1996, p. 1072;
Entman 1993; Iyengar 1991; Zaller 1992), more recent studies have shown that
citizens consciously examine and evaluate frames before drawing opinions (Brewer
2001; Chong 1996; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997; Nelson, Oxley and Clawson
1997). Subsequent work has also documented the many limits of framing and
painted a much more nuanced picture of how the process may work in the presence
of constraints that often exist in the real world.
The role that emotions play in framing has not received nearly as much atten-
tion, however. Frames often rely upon emotional appeals and can be designed to
elicit specific emotional reactions. But how exactly do these emotions operate to
influence framing effects? Do they act as a bridge between frames and framing
effects, essentially mediating the impact of the frames. Or are they exogenous
factors that affect how frames are perceived? Finally, how do the emotions that
frames elicit affect attitudes? This paper represents an initial effort toward ad-
dressing these questions. I begin by analyzing the state of the literature on the
psychology of framing in order to demonstrate how emotions have received little
coverage. I then lay out a theory of emotional intensity as a crucial part of the
framing process—the intensity of emotional reactions to a frame influence how im-
portant beliefs brought up by the frame are viewed, affecting subsequent opinions.
An experiment tests my specific expectations. I conclude with a discussion of my
results, the potential drawbacks and limitations of my experimental design, and
directions for future research.
The Psychology of Framing Effects
The Framing Process
Framing can be used by either political elites or the news media to shape the
debate on an issue. By emphasizing certain aspects of an issue or presenting it
in a specific way, the media can influence—or frame—how audiences perceive it
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). Effective frames alter belief importance (Nelson,
Clawson and Oxley 1997; Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997; Nelson and Kinder
1996; Druckman 2001a) and shape opinions because they activate new or existing
beliefs and feelings, increase the importance of certain considerations, and affect
the way people evaluate issues (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson 1997; Nelson, Willey
and Oxley 1998; Chong and Druckman 2007c).
Because framing works by altering the considerations people use in their eval-
uation of an issue, framing effects can be described through several mediational
processes. Specifically, Chong and Druckman (2007a,b) identify availability, acces-
sibility, and applicability as the three main cognitive mediators of framing effects.
An available consideration is one that is “stored in memory” and therefore ready
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to be retrieved and applied to the frame (Chong and Druckman 2007a, p. 110).
So, a person must understand the meaning of a consideration before it can be con-
nected to an issue. An accessible consideration is one that has been retrieved from
long-term memory. The more a person is exposed to or thinks about a considera-
tion, the more accessible it will be. Finally, applicability refers to the relevance of
a consideration to the issue at hand. More applicable considerations are weighted
more heavily when forming opinions. So, framing effects occur by making a belief
available in someone’s memory, easily accessible, and applicable to the considera-
tions at hand. Thus, a frame does not directly alter opinions about an issue but
does so indirectly. As illustrated in Figure 1, the degree to which a frame makes
beliefs brought up by the frame available, accessible, and applicable determines
how important those beliefs will be viewed—meaning belief importance can be
thought of as a function of these cognitive processes (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson
1997; Nelson, Willey and Oxley 1998; Nelson and Kinder 1996). It is the impor-
tance assigned to relevant beliefs that then shapes attitudes. Critically, though,
this model only includes the cognitive factors that influence considerations brought
up by a frame, failing to account for how emotions can affect these considerations.
Fig. 1: The Traditional Framing Model
Limits to Framing
As the research on framing and framing effects has expanded, researchers have
sought to determine the limits of framing and refute the notion of framing as a
tool used by elites to manipulate a fickle and mindless public (Druckman 2001a;
Kinder and Herzog 1993; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). The conflict about the
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different ways individuals examine frames has led to research on the moderators of
framing effects—factors affecting the power of frames to shift opinions. However,
just as the examination of how framing works has focused on cognitive factors,
analyses of moderators have focused on the cognitive limitations to framing while
largely ignoring the influence of emotions.
Competition among frames is one critical moderator (Sniderman and Theriault
2004; Druckman 2004; Brewer and Gross 2005; Edy and Meirick 2007; Chong
and Druckman 2007a,c). As Sniderman and Theriault (2004) note, people are
rarely presented with one frame in isolation but must contend with competing
frames. When this occurs, they find that the competing frames have no effect on
individuals; instead, people use preexisting beliefs to form their opinions. When
individuals are presented with multiple competing frames, framing effects tend to
weaken significantly (Druckman 2004; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Competing
frames tend to cancel one another out, especially when both frames are strong,
and strong frames tend to dominate weak ones (Chong and Druckman 2007a).
Discussion between individuals has also been shown to moderate framing effects
(Druckman and Nelson 2003; Druckman 2004; Sniderman and Theriault 2004).
After being presented with a frame, deliberation with citizens who hold differing
views diminishes framing effects, although it does not eliminate them (Druckman
and Nelson 2003; Druckman 2001b).
Studies also show that citizens with low political knowledge are more suscepti-
ble to framing (Kinder and Sanders 1990; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001), though
other research indicates the opposite is true (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Nelson,
Oxley and Clawson 1997; Miller and Krosnick 2000). However, Chong and Druck-
man (2007b) find that, after controlling for prior attitudes, framing has a greater
impact on knowledgeable people because knowledge “increases the likelihood that
the considerations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to
the individual” (Chong and Druckman 2007b, p. 112).
Credible sources also make frames more effective, especially if the frame is
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strong (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Druckman 2001a). Though focusing their
efforts on priming and agenda setting, Miller and Krosnick (2000) note that “trust-
worthy sources are more persuasive than more dubious sources” (p. 303). For
example, framing effects are stronger when an individual identifies ideologically
with the source of the frame (Hartman and Weber 2009). In addition, frames are
more effective if they are sponsored by a political party that a person supports.
These effects become more pronounced for issues on which the parties are divided
and when a person is more politically attentive (Slothuus and de Vreese 2010).
Again, while past research has revealed a great deal about the psychology
of framing effects, almost all of this work focuses on the cognitive processing of
frames. Both the traditional model of framing and research on the major moder-
ators of framing effects only take into account the cognitive factors that influence
information processing. For a more complete understanding of the framing pro-
cess, it is necessary to examine whether an individual’s emotions contribute to
how frames are viewed and what the consequences of this are for framing effects.
Importantly, an examination of the factors that moderate framing effects shows
that they are conceptualized as exogenous factors that are separate from the frames
themselves. Emotions, on the other hand, arise as reactions to a frame and can
be a core part of what makes an effective frame. This indicates that emotions
contribute to framing effects in a way the traditional framing model—which focuses
on cognitive processes—fails to explain. The next section seeks to place emotions
in the framing process and develop a more precise theory of their role.
Emotions and Framing
Recently, scholars have begun to explore emotions within the framing process.
However, this work has not been comprehensive, leaving uncertainty about what
role emotions play in how individuals process frames. Various research has treated
emotions as consequences of frames, as frames themselves, or as tied to particular
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types of frames. However, what has yet to be developed is a coherent and com-
prehensive theory of how emotions influence the framing process as a whole. In
this section, I begin by critically assessing the contributions of previous research.
I then present my own theoretical account of the place of emotions in the framing
process, focusing on the role of emotional intensity. Finally, I explore the particular
aspects of frames that elicit emotions and present my specific expectations.
Extant Research and Its Limitations
In an experimental test of value frames, Brewer (2001) found that frames pro-
duced either a cognitive or an emotional response—but not both—that depended
on the respondent’s favorability toward the frame. However, given the complex-
ity of most frames and the environment in which they occur, it is more likely
that frames are processed both cognitively and affectively, with each response
contributing to how a frame operates.
Gross and D’Ambrosio (2004) treat emotional responses as framing effects—so
they view emotions as a consequence of the framing process rather than an integral
part of it. They find that frames affect the cognitive explanations people give for
their emotions more than their specific emotional reactions. While opposing frames
may cause respondents to feel the same emotions, these feelings are cognitively
justified in different ways and directed differently. In addition, predispositions such
as ideology and racial resentment mediate these effects (Gross and D’Ambrosio
2004). While the authors show that frames can affect emotional responses, they
do not go further and examine how emotions influence opinions. In addition, they
focus on the effects of individual predispositions on emotional reactions, ignoring
the role that the frame itself can play.
In more recent work, certain types of frames are shown to indirectly affect
opinions through emotional responses, with cognitive responses also influenc-
ing opinions (Gross 2008). However, these results are only tested for episodic
frames—those that rely on a particular person, event, or story to present an issue.
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These are contrasted with thematic frames—which use a broader context to define
issues. But while thematic frames are less emotional than episodic frames, they
do trigger emotions, meaning that the same indirect effect on opinions should hold
for episodic frames. Examining frames generally, instead of focusing on specific
types of frames, should provide a deeper understanding of the role of emotions.
Negative emotions, particularly their intensity and placement within a message,
also mediate persuasive appeals and can affect information recall and opinions
(Nabi 1999). This work, though, focuses not on framing but persuasive appeals.
Framing attempts to influence the way people understand an issue, which does
not necessarily involve persuasion.
Nabi (2003) argues that emotions themselves can function as frames, guiding
information processing and affecting belief availability and accessibility as well
as subsequent judgments. She uses emotions as frames by asking people how
they feel about an issue. This essentially creates an emotional lens through which
people view the issue, hence turning the emotion itself into a frame and influencing
subsequent opinions. This research is limited because it assumes that frames are
purely emotional and that priming an emotional response is equivalent to framing.
However, frames are often more nuanced—using stories, examples, and values to
evoke emotions. As a result, Nabi’s approach is only a specific case of what can
constitute a frame.
While Petersen (2008) shows that emotional arguments affect policy prefer-
ences, he does not test for emotional responses to frames. Instead, he considers
reactions to issues themselves, meaning that the emotional reactions stem not
from the frame but from already-formed opinions about the issue. This approach
suggests that a person’s preexisting feelings about an issue dominate how they
view it, with frames having little power to influence those views. Emotions can
also influence a frame’s effect on risky choice (Druckman and McDermott 2008).
However, this work treats emotions as moderators of framing effects—exogenous
factors—rather than reactions to the frames.
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Taken together, past work on emotions and framing reveals that emotions do
influence attitudes. However, this work only explores a small aspect of the framing
process and reveals little about the systematic influence emotions have on fram-
ing effects. What previous research does indicate is that emotions can serve as
mediators between the message—or frame—and opinion formation. Frames can
elicit emotional reactions that aid in information processing and influence subse-
quent opinions. More recent work has begun to examine this mediational role of
emotions. Anger and sadness-inducing frames have been found to influence the
type of information processing individuals engage in—systematic and heuristic,
respectively—which in turn affects opinions (Kim and Cameron 2011). This work
builds on Nabi (1999, 2003) and conceptualizes emotions as frames while focusing
only on the effects of specific emotions—sadness and anger. As noted previously,
this conceptualization is problematic because it restricts the types of frames that
can be examined. The authors also focus on organizational crisis and response,
an area with limited political applicability. Aaroe (2011) shows that emotional
intensity can influence the framing process. Episodic frames become more effec-
tive—and therefore stronger—than thematic frames as the intensity of emotional
reactions increases. Again, however, this theory is only applied to particular types
of frames, limiting what we can conclude about frames generally.
A More Complete Framing Model
In light of these theoretical limitations, I aim to develop a more precise model
of the way emotions influence framing effects. The traditional model of framing
focuses on cognitive effects and holds that a frame alters belief importance—a func-
tion of the availability, accessibility, and applicability of considerations brought up
by the frame—and thus shapes attitudes. My theory modifies this model by adding
emotions into the process as an additional mediating factor. Specifically, I argue
that emotional intensity acts as a mediator between the stimulus—a frame—and
belief importance, affecting subsequent opinions. This appears similar to Aaroe’s
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conceptualization, but it actually differs in key ways. Aaroe argues that emotional
intensity is inextricably linked to the type of frame; episodic frames are essential
to generating emotional responses. In contrast, I expect emotional intensity to be
influential for frames generally. Additionally, and importantly, I argue that emo-
tional intensity is a mediator of the framing process, not a moderator. In order
to do so, I draw upon theories of cognitive appraisal as well as affect and arousal
as information. These theories indicate precisely how and why the intensity of
emotional reactions to frames alters belief importance and affects opinions.
Cognitive appraisal theories of emotion hold that emotions are “cognitively
elaborated affective states” that arise from appraisals of the surrounding environ-
ment (Clore and Ortony 2008, p. 629; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Roseman 1991;
Ortony, Clore and Collins 1988). Appraisals refine these undifferentiated affective
states into emotion. Certain situations tend to elicit particular appraisals that cor-
respond to underlying affective dimensions. This then gives rise to a corresponding
emotion (Clore and Ortony 2008). Appraisal theories indicate that expressions,
experiences, and cognition are components rather than causes of emotion. There-
fore, these factors combine to create appraisals that correspond to certain emotions
(Barrett, Ochsner and Gross 2006; Clore and Ortony 2000). So, for example, we
get angry at people who we blame for bad events, or we are hopeful in situations
where we anticipate positive events.
While appraisal theories differ on the number of appraisal categories, how they
are defined, and precisely what role each plays in synthesizing emotions, common-
alities exist (Lanctot and Hess 2007). The Appraisal-Tendency Framework (ATF)
is one specific appraisal theory that explains how specific emotions and their as-
sociated appraisal tendencies can influence future judgments (Han, Lerner and
Keltner 2007). According to the ATF (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001), “specific
emotions give rise to specific cognitive and motivational processes, which account
for the effects of each emotion upon judgment and decision making” (Han, Lerner
and Keltner 2007, p. 158). Separate emotions have separate cognitive appraisal
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dimensions and themes that affect subsequent cognitions—including the content
and depth of thought—in line with the appraisal tendencies the emotion brings
up. Importantly, the ATF not only shows that emotions are defined by certain
appraisal dimensions, but that emotions affect judgments in a way that directly
corresponds to the dimensions at hand. The ATF indicates that differentiating
emotions beyond valence is important, and that an emotion-specific approach may
be more reasonable. So, emotions of the same valence should have different effects
on judgments because they are based on unique appraisal tendencies.
In addition to the ATF, psychological theories of affect as information provide
a basis for how emotions fit into the framing process as mediators. Affect as infor-
mation (Schwarz and Clore 1983, 1988, 1996) holds that “the experience of affect
is...crucial for providing us with conscious information about our unconscious ap-
praisals” (Clore and Storbeck 2006, p. 124). When making judgments about a
stimulus, individuals often consult their affective responses—their positive or neg-
ative feelings. That is, an affective reaction actually provides us with information
that we can use in judging situations. Generally, positive affect signals positive
judgments, whereas negative affect signals negative judgments (Schwarz and Clore
1988). However, the informational value of affect goes beyond the simple equating
of valence with judgment. The source of affect and its meaning signal how infor-
mative affect will be viewed (Schwarz and Clore 1983). Context plays a role as
well, such that negative affect can actually be viewed positively in certain situa-
tions (Martin 2001). Research also indicates that affect provides information for
judgments because it can serve as a heuristic for the desirability of stimuli (Slovic
et al. 2003; Monin 2003). Importantly, these findings apply to both incidental
affect—affect stemming from sources other than the stimuli at hand—and integral
affect—which is attributed to the stimuli being evaluated. However, relying on
incidental affect can lead to judgments based on misleading information. In addi-
tion to providing information about judgments, affect can also provide information
that promotes specific types of cognitive processing, which depend on the type of
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affective reaction (Clore et al. 2001; Clore and Huntsinger 2007).
While affect provides information about experienced stimuli, research has
shown that emotional arousal—or intensity—can also serve a similar role. Stor-
beck and Clore (2008) note that while affect provides information about the value
of a stimulus, arousal serves as information about its urgency, importance, or per-
sonal relevance. Importantly, arousal cues can be transferred from unrelated or
irrelevant sources and affect judgments toward a relevant consideration, especially
if the cue occurs in close temporal proximity to the judgment at hand (Zillman
1971; Dutton and Aron 1974). Arousal can lead to more intense, polarized eval-
uations (Paulhus and Lim 1994) while also causing positive advertisements to be
viewed more positively and negative ads more negatively (Gorn, Pham and Sin
2001). This indicates that arousal influences a person’s reaction to a target in
addition to the evaluation of the target itself. It has also been shown that arousal
stimulates amygdala activity—the area of the brain associated with the evaluation
of stimuli (Atchley et al. 2007). Moreover, arousal activates accessible judgments
and increases stereotypic judgments through increased amygdala activity (Boden-
hausen 1993; Phelps et al. 2000). Because the amygdala is more responsive to
arousal than valence, high arousal stimulates activity and intensifies evaluations
(Storbeck, Robinson and McCourt 2006). Arousal is also important because it
draws attention to the arousing stimuli, discounting remaining information (Heuer
and Reisberg 1990; Matthews 2006). As a whole, these findings show that more
arousing stimuli are judged as more important, which influences how the stimulus
is evaluated and reactions to it.
Drawing upon this work, I contend that frames elicit emotional reactions in
a person. The intensity of these emotional responses then affects the importance
of beliefs brought up by the frame—typically seen as a function of availability,
accessibility, and applicability—in a way that shifts opinions. The concepts un-
derlying appraisal theory, the ATF, and theories of affect and arousal as infor-
mation provide the mechanisms by which emotional intensity should affect belief
11
importance and mediate the framing process. Appraisal theory makes clear that
individuals evaluate a stimulus—in this case a frame—cognitively and feel emo-
tions that are unique to the frame. According to the ATF, appraisal tendencies
associated with certain emotions should carry over to affect judgments. Therefore,
the specific emotions a person feels, apart from simply valence, matter for their
evaluations. Theories of affect and arousal as information show that individuals
use their emotional responses as information about how to judge the situations
they encounter. Affect serves as information about the value of a frame, and
arousal provides information about its importance and urgency. Crucially, then,
emotional arousal—intensity—should provide information about the importance
of beliefs associated with a frame and indicate that those beliefs have value.
Fig. 2: An Updated Framing Model Accounting for Emotions
As previously elaborated, framing works by altering the importance a person
assigns to the beliefs that are relevant to the issue being framed (Nelson, Oxley
and Clawson 1997; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997; Nelson, Willey and Oxley
1998; Druckman 2001a). In this context, a belief is any consideration, quality, or
characteristic of an issue that a person has previously formed a judgment about
or that a frame creates. Because individuals evaluate the importance of different
considerations brought up by the frame, emotions should play a role in influencing
these evaluations. As shown in Figure 2, the importance a person assigns to a belief
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can be seen partly as a function of the intensity of the emotional response the frame
elicits. If a frame does not elicit an emotional response, a person will not judge
the considerations at hand as important, and therefore the frame will do less to
affect opinions. On the other hand, a frame that elicits a strong emotional reaction
will affect belief importance and thus opinions. While specific emotions may be
more likely to alter belief importance—for example, negative emotions—emotional
intensity should play as big of a role. Specific emotions reflect combinations of
valence and intensity, so high intensity emotions should have a greater impact.
How Frames Elicit Emotions
While I expect emotional intensity to mediate framing effects, one important
question is what factors trigger emotions. Individual predispositions and prefer-
ences should cause people to have different reactions to the same frame. A frame
may elicit different emotions and, more importantly, different degrees of emo-
tional response in people based on factors such as ideology, knowledge, political
sophistication, and political party. However, appraisal theory is concerned with
the contextual nature of emotions. Individuals’ emotional reactions result from
how they cognitively appraise an event or frame. Accordingly, affective responses
should be at least partly dependent on the content of a frame. Therefore, both
characteristics of the frame as well as the individual can contribute to emotional re-
sponses. Because my theory relates to how frames themselves influence emotions,
I am more interested in aspects of the frame that shape emotional reactions.
There are many potential characteristics of a frame—or a message more
broadly—that can influence emotions: values present in the frame, the type of
argument employed, the narrative aspects of the frame, the imagery and sym-
bolism the frame employs, and explicit emotional token words. All of these are
factors of the frame itself that serve as catalysts of an emotional reaction. Brewer
(2001, 2002, 2003) examines value frames and how people process them. He argues
that frames allow citizens to connect values to specific issues and thus evaluate
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them. Thus, value frames will more easily allow a connection to those values and
make framing effects more prominent (Brewer 2001, 2003; Zaller 1992; Kinder and
Sanders 1996). Marietta (2009) argues that Democratic and Republican elites
differ in their arguments and rhetoric. Democrats tend to be more goal and fact
oriented, whereas Republicans focus on sacred values and morals. These symbolic
and value oriented frames tend to win out rhetorically. Barker (2005) shows that
Democratic and Republican primary voters respond differently to egalitarian and
individualistic frames. These values are chronically accessible to individuals, and
thus they respond strongly to them. Highly educated voters respond even more
strongly “because they are most likely to see the connections between value prior-
ities, ideology, and partisanship” (Barker 2005, p. 388). Thus, values—both those
present in frames and those elicited by frames—may generate emotional reactions
that increase framing effects.
Cobb and Kuklinski (1997) distinguish between hard and easy arguments.
Hard arguments are complex, long, factual, and cognitively challenging, whereas
easy arguments are simple, short, and symbolic. They conclude that “easy (and
con) arguments will prevail in most real-world circumstances” (Cobb and Kuklin-
ski 1997, p. 115).
Berinsky and Kinder (2006) find that framing an issue as a story with a clear
narrative and structure “affected what people remembered, how they structured
what they remembered, and the opinions they expressed” (p. 640). They draw on
work on textual comprehension (Kintsch 1998) and models of jury trial decision-
making (Hastie and Pennington 1995; Pennington and Hastie 1986, 1988, 1992,
1993) to argue that the narrative structure, organization, and text of a frame
contribute to its effectiveness. These narrative elements aid in understanding and
increase the resonance of the frame. Work on narrative persuasion also shows
that stories are effective at evoking emotions. Narratives themselves promote
engagement, which evokes emotional reactions to the story as well as enjoyment of
the story. Increased enjoyment subsequently leads to the story having more of an
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impact on attitudes and behavior (Busselle and Bilandzic 2009; Green and Brock
2000; Murphy et al. 2011).
Lakoff (1996, 2006, 2008) explores the different rhetorical approaches of Democrats
and Republicans. Republicans enjoy a rhetorical advantage because they frame
their arguments in metaphorical and symbolic terms. The most prominent metaphor
is the nation as a family (Lakoff 1996). He also argues that liberals’ rhetoric fo-
cuses on facts and figures, whereas conservatives employ morals-based frames and
symbolism, which usually win out (Lakoff 2008).
As part of the theory of the cognitive structure of emotions, Ortony, Clore
and Collins (1988) examine how different emotional tokens are used to describe
emotions based on their intensity. These token words describe emotions and can
be included in a frame. When a person encounters a frame, token words key a
specific emotional reaction and may determine its intensity.
These factors could simply cause a frame to elicit intense emotions. However,
a more nuanced relationship is possible. They may also directly affect belief im-
portance themselves.1 A frame, which draws upon values, symbols, and narrative
structure to increase belief importance, generates emotional responses in its recip-
ients. The total effect of these factors on belief importance is a combination of
their direct effect and an indirect effect that operates through the emotions they
elicit.2 Because this study is a first step, I am only interested in testing the medi-
ational role of emotional intensity in framing effects. The frames I develop elicit
emotional responses through emotional tokens and language. As such, I do not
incorporate the above factors into my experimental analysis, with the exception
of emotional token words.
1 The one exception to this is emotional token words. Because these words are explicitly
emotional and designed to elicit an emotional response, they should do just that. Therefore,
emotional language should not directly affect belief importance but work solely through emotional
responses.
2 While I suspect this explanation to be the case, its scope is beyond that of this study.
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Expectations
Based on my theoretical framework and past research on emotions, I have sev-
eral expectations. First, the intensity of the emotional reactions that a frame
elicits will be positively related to the perceived importance of the considerations
at hand—i.e. the importance assigned to beliefs brought up by the frame. Second,
the considerations made relevant by the frame should be weighted more highly,
causing them to be used when forming opinions. Therefore, frames that elicit
a higher intensity of emotional reactions should have a stronger effect on opin-
ions. However, this relationship is not direct. The effect of emotional intensity
on opinions should be mediated by belief importance. Third, increased emotional
intensity should lead to stronger frames. A frame’s strength increases as its per-
suasiveness and ability to influence opinions increases. Because I expect highly
emotional frames to have greater effects on opinions, those frames should be sub-
jectively evaluated as stronger than frames that do not elicit intense emotions.
Finally, previous research has shown that negative emotions have different effects
on opinions than positive emotions (Nabi 2003; Druckman and McDermott 2008).
In addition, affect as information theory holds that positive emotions lead to posi-
tive evaluations of a stimulus, while negative emotions lead to negative evaluations
of a stimulus. Therefore, individuals who report positive emotions will feel more
positively toward the frame, and individuals who report negative emotions will
feel more negatively toward the frame. These impressions should translate to the
issue associated with the frames, with positive emotions generating more support
for the issue and negative emotions generating less support.
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An Experimental Test
Participants, Design, and Procedure
In order to test my theory of emotional intensity mediating the framing pro-
cess, I designed a survey experiment based on two separate issues: the Libyan
civil war and Social Security reform. Both issues were covered extensively in the
period leading up to the experiment and have the ability to elicit both negative
and positive emotions. Participants were UNC undergraduates who completed
the experiment as part of a course requirement. A total of 304 individuals partic-
ipated in the experiment, which was administered online using Qualtrics survey
software.3
The study follows a 2 (issue: Libya vs. Social Security) × 2 (emotion: com-
passion vs. anger) × 2 (intensity: high vs. low) between-subjects design. For each
issue, four separate frames were developed. Two were meant to elicit compas-
sion—a positive emotion—and two were meant to elicit anger—a negative emo-
tion—in the respondent. Each emotion had two conditions—one that was meant
to elicit a high intensity emotional reaction and one that was meant to elicit a low
intensity emotional reaction. The high and low intensity frames were identical in
format except for emotional words and modifying adjectives inserted into the high
intensity frames to elicit stronger emotions. The frames were designed as mock
news articles. They presented information about the issue that included quotes
from major sources and analysis of the implications—for Libya, the issue was the
civil war and the role of the U.N. or U.S. in the conflict; for Social Security, it
was the debt ceiling debate and potential proposals to reform Social Security. The
text of each of the frames is shown in the Appendix.
3 The average age of the sample was 18.67. Other sample statistics include the following:
91% freshmen and sophomores, 67% females, 80% Caucasian, 18% political science majors,
55% Protestants, 45% liberals, 39% conservatives, 47% self-identified and leaning Democrats,
42% self-identified and leaning Republicans. There was also variance on political interest and
attention. Additional details about the sample and the analyses presented are available from the
author.
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Respondents were first presented with a questionnaire that asked them de-
mographic questions, measured their knowledge about both issues, and assessed
their political predispositions. After these initial questions, they were randomly
presented with one of the eight frames or a control condition. In the control con-
dition, respondents saw no news article and were only asked questions assessing
their opinions about the issues dealt with by the frames. All opinion questions
were measured on a 5-point scale, which varied from “strongly favor” to “strongly
oppose.” In all cases, the text of the opinion questions was the same in the control
condition as the framing conditions. Along with each opinion question, respon-
dents in both the control and treatment groups were asked how certain they were
of their opinion and how much their emotions influenced their opinion. Opinion
certainty was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from “not certain at all” to
“extremely certain.” Emotional influence was also measured on a 5-point scale
ranging from “not at all” to “very much so.” In order to increase the number of
respondents in each condition, those who were randomly assigned to a treatment
condition saw an additional story and answered questions dealing with it. In all
cases, the issue and emotion differed for the two stories a respondent saw.4
After reading the news stories, respondents were asked to subjectively rate
the strength of the story by indicating both how compelling and how valuable
they rated the story. They were also asked whether or not the issue in the news
article represented “an issue that was important to the nation.” This question
was used as a measure of belief importance. All of these questions consisted of
a 5-point response scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”.
Respondents were also asked if they felt each of seven different emotions: anger,
hope, fear, pride, frustration, sympathy, and worry. If they answered that they
felt a particular emotion while reading the article, they were asked to indicate
how strongly they felt that emotion. This strength of emotion rating was used
4 So, for example, a person who saw a high intensity Social Security compassion frame as their
first news story would then be randomly assigned to either a high or low intensity Libya anger
frame for the second news story.
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as a measure of emotional intensity; the rating is a 7-point scale that varies from
“extremely weak” to “extremely strong.”
I follow previous research and use self-reports (Nabi 2003; Druckman and Mc-
Dermott 2008; Kim and Cameron 2011; Aaroe 2011) to measure emotions and
emotional intensity. Research has shown these self-reports to be effective and
meaningful (Atchley et al. 2007; Cahill et al. 1996; Corson and Verrier 2007; Robin-
son et al. 2004). In addition, for each emotion, the respondents were given a list
of emotional targets. They were asked to rate how strongly they felt a particular
emotion directed toward each of the targets. These targets consisted of most of
the people or institutions mentioned in each article. However, these emotional tar-
gets were not included in the final analysis. Finally, respondents were asked their
opinions on the issues dealt with by the frames, their opinion certainty, and the
influence of their emotions. For Social Security compassion, one opinion question
was used. For the other three issues and emotions, two opinion questions were
used. The text of these questions is shown in the Appendix.
In order to test for differences between the treatment groups (and between the
treatment groups and the control group), I perform a series of t-tests to determine
if the difference between the mean values of opinions, emotional intensity, issue
importance, and strength of the groups are statistically significant. I also perform
a series of ordered logistic regressions to determine if emotional intensity influences
opinions, perceived strength of the stories, and issue importance.
Results
As a first check to determine whether or not the intensity manipulations worked
properly, I performed a series of t-tests comparing the levels of reported emotional
intensity between those who received the low and high intensity frames for each
issue. Because there are four frames—Social Security and Libya compassion and
anger—and seven emotions, this results in 28 t-tests. Unexpectedly, the t-tests
19
show no differences in emotional intensity between any of the framed conditions.5
These results indicate that the intensity manipulations did not work as intended,
and thus that any other potential comparisons based on treatment groups will be
uninformative. Because the treatment groups do not differ on emotional intensity,
the role of emotional intensity cannot be meaningfully explored across groups.
While looking at differences across treatment groups does not allow for an
adequate test of the expectations laid out above, I can examine whether or not
levels of emotional intensity correspond to effects on opinions, perceived strength
of the frames, or perceived issue importance—i.e. belief importance. The results
of these analyses are show in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.6 While some emotions do
show significant effects, no one emotion in a framed condition is statistically sig-
nificantly related to opinions on more than one opinion question. In addition,
there are no clear patterns in the relationships that do exist. With such a large
number of specified models, the number of significant relationships that emerges
is no different than what would be found due to random chance.7 However, all
the relationships that do emerge are in the correct direction, indicating that the
relationships between emotional intensity and opinions, perceived strength of the
story, and issue importance are at least somewhat present.
5 Those in the Social Security compassion low and high intensity treatments differed on sym-
pathy, but in the wrong direction: the low intensity group reported higher levels of sympathy
than the high intensity group. Libya compassion low mean = 2.71; Libya compassion high mean
= 3.87; mean difference p-value = 0.04.
6 The models shown are simple univariate regressions with each emotion constituting the lone
predictor. The models were also run with controls for gender, race, economic status, religiosity,
attention paid to the issue, and party identification. Including these controls did not change
the results, and in many cases added so many degrees of freedom that the models could not be
estimated.
7 Of the 49 models evaluating the effect of emotional intensity on opinions, only 5 are sta-
tistically significant at the 0.05 level. Based on random chance alone, the expected number of
statistically significant relationships should be 2.45. A binomial test shows that the probability
that the true success rate is less than or equal to 0.05 = 0.097.
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One interesting result is that of the 28 models evaluating the effects of emo-
tional intensity on judgments of how compelling the story was, 10 display statistical
significance, all in the correct direction.8 This indicates that while emotional inten-
sity is not linked to opinions or issue importance, it does appear to be influencing
how respondents feel about the articles.
Since there are no differences between treatment conditions, a more basic com-
parison is between the treatment groups and the control group. I expect exposure
to a frame to shift opinions relative to not seeing a frame. If the treatments do
not differ from the control, this would indicate that the frames did not work at
all. A series of t-tests between the different treatment conditions and the control
group indicates that differences in opinions are largely absent.9 No differences
exist between any of the Social Security framed conditions and the control group,
or between the Libya anger frames and the control group. However, respondents
who saw either of the Libya compassion frames were more likely to support U.S.
involvement in Libya than those who saw no article.10 Those who saw the Libya
compassion high intensity frame were also more supportive of a U.N. no-fly zone in
Libya than those who saw no article.11 Notably, however, these differences do not
appear as a result of differences in emotions. When asked how much their emo-
tions influenced their opinions, those in the framed groups did not report being
influenced by their emotions any more than those in the control group.12 These
differences indicate that the Libya frames influence opinions more than the Social
Security frames, though the effect of the Libya frames is not a function of their
8 A binomial test indicates that there is almost no chance (p-value = 0.00) that the true
success rate is less than or equal to 0.05.
9 Since the control group saw no news article, there is no way to test for differences on strength
and issue importance.
10 Libya compassion low mean = 2.79; Control mean = 3.47; mean difference p-value = 0.002.
Libya compassion high mean = 2.64; Control mean = 3.47; mean difference p-value = 0.000.
11 Libya compassion high mean = 2.12; Control mean = 2.48; mean difference p-value = 0.03.
12 Libya compassion low intensity: U.S. involvement emotion influence mean = 3.17; Control
mean = 3.47; mean difference p-value = 0.17. Libya compassion high intensity: U.S. involvement
emotion influence mean = 3.37; Control mean = 3.47; mean difference p-value = 0.65. Libya
compassion high intensity: U.N. no-fly zone emotion influence mean = 3.39; Control mean =
3.61; mean difference p-value = 0.36.
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ability to elicit emotions. While the Libya frames do not differ based on emotional
intensity, they do shift opinions relative to not seeing a frame.
Finally, I am interested in whether respondents exposed to an anger frame
were affected differently than those exposed to a compassion frame. I expect
a positive emotion like compassion to generate more support for an issue and
a negative emotion like anger to generate less support. Tables 5 and 6 show
differences in the mean values of emotional intensity, opinions, perceived strength,
and issue importance for the different frames. Again, the tables show very few
differences. While those exposed to a Libya compassion frame feel higher levels of
hope, sympathy, and worry, this does not translate to differing opinions. Those
exposed to a Social Security compassion frame are more supportive of reforming
Social Security, and respondents exposed to a Social Security anger frame consider
the issue more important. However, these do not appear to be results of differences
in emotions.
Table 5: Differences in Means Based on Valence for Libya
Anger Frame Compassion Frame Difference p-value
Anger 3.77 3.24 0.07
Hope 3.93 3.30 0.02
Fear 4.00 3.91 0.39
Pride 2.86 3.29 0.10
Frustration 3.35 3.15 0.23
Sympathy 3.35 2.74 0.01
Worry 3.65 3.18 0.05
U.S. Involvement Opinion 2.87 2.72 0.11
Opinion Certainty 2.78 3.00 0.06
Emotional Influence 3.40 3.27 0.19
Compelling Story 2.70 2.46 0.02
Valuable Story 2.29 2.13 0.06
Important Issue 2.06 2.04 0.46
Smaller mean values indicate greater emotional intensity, more favorable opinions, more cer-
tainty, and greater emotional intensity, perceived story strength, and issue importance. Bold
entries are significant at p=0.05 for a one-tailed test.
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Table 6: Differences in Means Based on Valence for Social Security
Anger Frame Compassion Frame Difference p-value
Anger 3.67 3.18 0.13
Hope 3.71 3.41 0.17
Fear 3.94 4.10 0.34
Pride 3.33 3.50 0.39
Frustration 3.10 3.55 0.10
Sympathy 3.83 3.50 0.24
Worry 3.09 3.56 0.05
S.S. Reform Opinion 2.93 2.54 0.00
Opinion Certainty 2.73 3.10 0.01
Emotional Influence 3.56 3.30 0.04
Compelling Story 2.87 2.90 0.40
Valuable Story 2.24 2.33 0.18
Important Issue 1.60 1.86 0.01
Smaller mean values indicate greater emotional intensity, more favorable opinions, more
certainty, and greater emotional intensity, perceived story strength, and issue importance.
Bold entires are significant at p=0.05 for a one-tailed test.
Discussion
What all of these results indicate is that the experimental treatments simply
did not work as intended. Those in the high intensity emotion conditions do not
report feeling a higher intensity of emotions. Increases in emotional intensity are
not systematically related to opinions, perceived issue importance, or perceived
strength of the frames for either issue. However, I do not take this as a rejection
of my theoretical model. There are many potential reasons why the experiment
did not uncover the expected results.
The issues themselves may be at least party to blame. The frames were de-
veloped over a period of months when both Libya and Social Security were in
the news. However, the major events that the articles describe occurred during
the summer of 2011, a time when the students used for these analyses were not
in school and likely not paying much attention to the news. By the time this
survey was deployed, the issues had begun to lose prominence in the news. The
Libya frames may also be tainted because two weeks prior to the experiment’s
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deployment, Muammar el-Qaddafi was killed by Libyan forces. This event likely
influenced respondents’ views of the Libyan civil war. In addition, both issues
are not highly salient for college students. Foreign policy and Social Security are
issues that do not occupy a prominent place in a college student’s thoughts, pos-
sibly making it difficult for respondents to feel invested in the issue.13 Future
experiments should try to use more salient issues.
The news stories and the way in which the emotional manipulations were cre-
ated may also be problematic. These articles used emotion words in an attempt to
elicit stronger emotional reactions. The manipulation obviously did not work. As
outlined above, many other factors may influence emotional reactions, including
values, narrative, symbolism, and imagery. It is possible that the emotional words
inserted into the high intensity frames were not adequate, or that other methods
are needed to adequately manipulate the intensity of respondents’ emotional reac-
tions. Future studies need to develop several potential manipulations and pretest
them to ensure that the emotional manipulations work correctly. This experiment
did not employ a pretest because of time constraints.
Another possible explanation for the null results is likely the experimental
design itself, particularly the survey length. Because two separate issues were
examined, each respondent who saw a treatment saw two articles and answered
questions about each. This was done in order to increase the number of respon-
dents in each condition. Otherwise, with 300 respondents distributed over nine
conditions (eight treatments plus the control), the resulting sample size for each
treatment group would have been extremely low. However, the consequence of
this decision was to effectively double the length of the experiment for all respon-
dents who received a treatment. Each respondent had to answer a battery of
demographic and political predisposition questions, read a news article, answer
questions, read a second article, then answer more questions. This resulted in an
13 A related concern is the use of a student sample for the experiment. The problems with this
are myriad and have been well document and discussed.
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approximately 30-40 minute long survey, something most undergraduate students
would likely lose interest in quickly. The fact that there were seven emotions
that each had a group of five to nine emotional targets associated with them dra-
matically increased the length of the experiment. Because the respondents were
undergraduate students completing the survey as part of a course requirement, it
is likely that, after a certain point, they stopped reading the articles carefully or
answering the questions accurately.
The results also likely revealed nothing of note due to the low sample size,
which is also related to the survey design. After respondents read an article,
they were asked if they felt each of seven emotions. Only if they answered in
the affirmative were they prompted to indicate how strongly they felt a particular
emotion. Though each treatment condition had between 50 and 60 total respon-
dents, this design choice greatly reduced the number of respondents for the main
independent variable, which was especially a problem for the regression analyses.
In most cases, fewer than 20 respondents reported feeling a particular emotion
after reading a news article, meaning that every comparison and model that uses
emotional intensity as a predictor has an extremely small number of observations
off of which to make inferences. Oftentimes, including controls in a model added
too many degrees of freedom, leaving too few pieces of information for the model
to be estimated. In many cases, differences between groups or relationships in the
correct direction do exist, but the small sample size creates high uncertainty in
the estimates, making it difficult to draw valid inferences.
One potentially encouraging finding is the relationship between emotional in-
tensity and finding the story compelling. For all the frames, there is a pattern of
more emotional responses being connected to how compelling the story is viewed.
Finding the story compelling indicates that respondents are engaging with the
frame. Engagement is one mechanism through which narratives shape attitudes.
Research on narratives indicates that the key to their power is their ability to
engage a reader, allowing them to evoke emotions (Busselle and Bilandzic 2009).
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More engaging stories evoke stronger emotions, leading to a greater impact on at-
titudes (Busselle and Bilandzic 2009; de Graaf et al. 2011; Green and Brock 2000).
Although the frames developed for this experiment are not specifically narrative
in style, they do attempt to elicit emotions. And while the frames are not partic-
ularly effective, the fact that the emotionality they elicit is linked to finding the
frames compelling indicates that emotional intensity plays an important role in
how frames are viewed. Future studies should incorporate a more effective mea-
sure of engagement to further explore the relationship between engagement with
a frame and resulting emotions.
While this initial analysis did not reveal results to support my theoretical
expectations, I remain confident in the strength of the model I have developed.
Both past research and the mechanisms involved indicate that emotional intensity
should mediate the framing process, contributing to framing effects and helping
determine the strength of frames. The failure to incorporate emotions into the
framing process suggests an incomplete model that does not fully account for all
of the factors that influence framing effects. A better experimental design should
alleviate many of the problems described above. Armed with a more effective
experiment, more informative findings should follow.
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APPENDIX
Experimental Articles
Fig. 3: Libya Anger Low Intensity Frame
WHITE HOUSE DEFENDS CONTINUING U.S. ROLE IN LIBYA OPERATION
By Terrence Ryan
June 15, 2011
OMAHA — The White House, responding to criticism in Congress over the air war in Libya, stated today
that President Obama had the authority to continue the military campaign without Congressional
approval because American involvement fell short of full-blown hostilities.
In a 38-page report sent to lawmakers describing and defending the NATO-led operation, the White
House said the objectives were, protecting Libya’s civilian population while also loosening Col.
Muammar el-Qaddafi’s grip on power.
In contending that the limited American role did not obligate the Administration to ask for authorization
under the War Powers Resolution, the report stated that “U.S. operations do not involve sustained
fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve U.S. ground troops.”
Essentially, the White House argues that the situation in Libya does not constitute a war, and therefore
the War Powers Resolution should not apply to it.
The report came one day after the House speaker, John A. Boehner, Republican of Ohio, had sent a letter
to Mr. Obama informing him that he appeared to be out of time under the War Powers Resolution,
which says that presidents have to terminate a mission 60 or 90 days after notifying Congress that
troops have been deployed into “hostilities,” unless lawmakers vote for the operation to continue.
The Libyan crisis began when its people took to the streets in February to seek reforms and stand up for
their human rights. Qaddafi’s security forces responded with extreme violence. Rather than respond to
the international community’s demand for an end to the violence, Qaddafi’s forces continued their
assault against the Libyan people.
On March 17, the United Nations Security Council responded by calling for an immediate cease-fire and
approving a no-fly zone over Libya.  Joining with a coalition of allies, including NATO partners, the
United States has aided in the protection of Libya’s civilian population.
Despite the humanitarian origins of the mission, over the last few months there has been increasing
criticism toward the Obama administration by both Democrats who oppose the war and Republicans
who cite Constitutional issues over the President’s failure to seek authorization from Congress for the
operations.  Both Democrats and Republicans have voiced concern that the President “has ignored
Congress,” and ignored the essence of the War Powers Resolution—that Congress should be consulted
before taking the country into war.
It is no surprise, then, that Republican Speaker Boehner has told President Obama that the House
considers the situation a problem, and therefore might seek through resolutions to end or limit the
United State’s involvement in Libya, or through the power of the purse to “defund” its participation.
In reply, administration officials have stated that abandoning a NATO-led mission right in the middle
could have serious consequences for our national security commitments in general.  Likewise, it would
make it difficult for the coalition in its operation designed to protect Libyan civilians and to enforce the
no-fly zone.
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Fig. 4: Libya Anger High Intensity Frame
WHITE HOUSE DEFENDS CONTINUING U.S. ROLE IN LIBYA OPERATION
By Terrence Ryan
June 15, 2011
OMAHA — The White House, pushing hard against criticism in Congress over the deepening air war in
Libya, claimed today that President Obama had the authority to continue the military campaign without
Congressional approval because American involvement fell well short of full-blown hostilities.  
In a 38-page report sent to lawmakers describing and defending the NATO-led operation, the White
House said the key objectives were, foremost, protecting Libya’s civilian population while also loosening
Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s brutal grip on power.
In declaring that the limited American role did not compel the Administration to receive authorization
under the War Powers Resolution, the report asserted unequivocally that “U.S. operations do not involve
sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve U.S. ground troops.”  
Essentially, the White House maintains that the situation in Libya does not constitute a war, and therefore
the War Powers Resolution simply does not apply to it.
The report came one day after the House speaker, John A. Boehner, Republican of Ohio, had sent a letter
to Mr. Obama warning him that he was out of time under the War Powers Resolution, which says that
presidents must terminate a mission 60 or 90 days after notifying Congress that troops have been
deployed into “hostilities,” unless lawmakers authorize the operation to continue.  
The Libyan crisis began when its people took to the streets in February to seek democratic reforms and
stand up for their human rights. Qaddafi’s security forces responded with extreme violence. Rather than
respond to the international community’s demand for an end to the violence, Qaddafi’s forces continued
their assault against the Libyan people.  
On March 17, the United Nations Security Council responded by calling for an immediate cease-fire and
approving a no-fly zone over Libya.  Joining with a coalition of allies, including NATO partners, the
United States has aided in the protection of Libya’s people.
Despite the humanitarian origins of the mission, over the last few months there has been increasing
hostility toward the Obama administration by both Democrats who strongly oppose the war and
Republicans who cite Constitutional issues over the President’s refusal to seek permission from Congress
for the operations.  Both Democrats and Republicans have angrily voiced alarm that the President “has
ignored Congress,” and ignored the very essence of the War Powers Resolution—that Congress must be
consulted before pulling the country into war.
It is no surprise, then, that Republican Speaker Boehner has repeatedly cautioned President Obama that
the House judges the situation indefensible, and therefore could seek through resolutions to end or
severely limit the United State’s involvement in Libya, or through the power of the purse to “defund” its
participation. 
In reply, administration officials have warned that deserting a NATO-led mission right in the middle
could have dire consequences for our national security commitments in general.  Likewise, it would make
it extremely difficult for the coalition in its operation designed to protect innocent Libyan civilians and to
enforce the no-fly zone.
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Fig. 5: Libya Compassion Low Intensity Frame
THE U.N. APPROVES NO-FLY ZONE OVER LIBYA
By Terrence Ryan
March 17, 2011
OMAHA — Today, the United Nations Security Council called for a cease-fire in Libya
and approved the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.   “Expressing
concern at the situation, violence, and civilian causalities,” the council approved the
measure by a vote of 10 to 0, with five abstentions.
In broad language, the council authorized member nations to take “all necessary
measures” short of “foreign occupation” to protect civilians.
The vote marked a turn in the world’s response to the situation in Libya after weeks of
debate and reluctance by many to intervene, and it comes as rebel forces were said to be
struggling in Benghazi.  The costs of inaction could have been substantial; thousands of
civilians might have been killed.
The Security Council’s action comes less than a month after it had passed Resolution
1970 reminding the Libyan authorities of their responsibility to protect their population
and respect human rights and international humanitarian law.  At that time, the
Security Council had also voted to impose sanctions on Libya’s leader, Muammar el-
Qaddafi, and his inner circle of advisers, and called for an international war crimes
investigation into the regime’s crackdown on Libyan citizens who had protested against
the government.
The crisis began when the Libyan people took to the streets in February to seek reforms
and stand up for their human rights. Qaddafi’s security forces responded with violence.
Fighter jets and helicopter gunships attacked people who had no means to defend
themselves. There were reports of government agents raiding homes and hospitals to
round up or kill wounded protestors, and of killings, arrests, and torture as Qaddafi’s
forces began attacks on cities that were standing up against his rule.
Rather than respond to the international community’s demand for an end to the
violence, Qaddafi’s forces continued their campaign against the Libyan people.  The
people of Libya appealed to the world for help.
The vote today is a key moment for the 192-member United Nations, and the next few
months will be watched closely as a test of its ability to take collective action to prevent
violence against civilians.  Diplomats said the specter of former conflicts in Bosnia,
Rwanda and Darfur, when a divided and sluggish Security Council was seen to have cost
lives, had given a sense of moral urgency to the debate.
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Fig. 6: Libya Compassion High Intensity Frame
THE U.N. APPROVES NO-FLY ZONE OVER LIBYA
By Terrence Ryan
March 17, 2011
OMAHA — Today, the United Nations Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire
in Libya and approved the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.
“Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the
heavy civilian causalities,” the council approved the measure by a vote of 10 to 0, with five
abstentions.  
In broad language, the council authorized member nations to take “all necessary measures”
short of “foreign occupation” to protect civilians under threat of attack.
The vote marked a dramatic turn in the world’s response to the Libyan crisis after weeks of
debate and reluctance by many to intervene, and it comes as courageous rebel forces were
said to be teetering on the brink of defeat in Benghazi.  The costs of inaction could have
been profound; thousands of civilians might have been slaughtered.
The Security Council’s decisive action comes less than a month after it had passed
Resolution 1970 firmly reminding the Libyan authorities of their fundamental
responsibility to protect their people and respect human rights and international
humanitarian law.  At that time, the Security Council had also voted unanimously to
impose sanctions on Libya’s leader, Muammar el-Qaddafi, and his inner circle of advisers,
and called for an international war crimes investigation into the regime’s bloody
crackdown on Libyan citizens who had spoken out against the murderous regime.   
The crisis began when the Libyan people took to the streets in February to seek democratic
reforms and stand up for their basic human rights. Qaddafi’s security forces responded
with extreme violence. Fighter jets and helicopter gunships fired on people who had no
means to defend themselves. There were reports of government agents storming homes
and hospitals to kidnap or kill wounded protestors, and of random killings, arbitrary
arrests, and torture as Qaddafi’s forces began a full-scale assault on cities that were
standing up against his rule.  
Rather than respond to the international community’s demand for an end to the violence,
the government’s forces continued their brutal assault against the Libyan people.  The
people of Libya cried out to the world for help.  
The vote today is a seminal moment for the 192-member United Nations, and the next few
months will be watched closely as a critical test of its ability to take collective action to
prevent atrocities against innocent civilians.  Diplomats said the specter of former conflicts
in Bosnia, Rwanda and Darfur, when a divided and sluggish Security Council was seen to
have cost countless lives, had given a deep sense of moral urgency to the debate.
34
Fig. 7: Social Security Anger Low Intensity Frame
SOCIAL SECURITY TAKES CENTER STAGE IN DEFICIT TALKS
By Carl Landler
July 6, 2011
OMAHA – President Obama is set to work for a deficit deal that will compel congressional
Democrats to accept cuts to Social Security. Mr. Obama plans to announce his proposal at
a meeting with House and Senate leaders tomorrow, where he will press policymakers to
take action on addressing the federal budget deficit.
After a secret meeting with House Speaker John A. Boehner (Republican-OH) over the
weekend, the president has raised his sights as Mr. Boehner has signaled a renewed
willingness to bargain on revenues.
While Mr. Boehner has become open to the possibility of ending certain tax breaks and
closing loopholes, Republicans continue to argue that any deficit plan contain no new tax
increases. “We are not for any proposal that increases taxes,” said House Majority Leader
Eric Cantor (Republican-VA).
Cuts to Social Security had previously been off the table in negotiations, and some
Democrats have expressed alarm at the president's proposal. “Depending on what they
decide to recommend, they may not have Democrats,” Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, a
Rhode Island Democrat, said in an interview.
The negotiations between the president and the speaker have raised concern. Democrats
are worried that they will be asked to accept a deal that is too heavily tilted toward
Republican ideas and that produces too little new revenue relative to the amount of the
cuts in programs like Social Security.
Senate Democrats have introduced their own plan, which leaves Social Security untouched
while proposing cuts at the Pentagon, as well as $2 trillion in higher taxes, primarily on
those earning more than $1 million per year.
Republicans have rejected that plan, saying a tax increase would be bad for an economy
already hurt by a 9.2 percent unemployment rate. “We want to tackle deficit reduction in a
way that doesn’t exacerbate unemployment,” said Senate Minority Leader Mitch
McConnell (Republican-KY).
Republicans also claim that the Democratic plan does too little to address the deficit and
federal spending.
Sources indicate that both sides are far from a deal, but that Social Security has become a
point of contention. Both parties have grown distrustful and unwilling to compromise,
making a potential deal difficult.
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Fig. 8: Social Security Anger High Intensity Frame
SOCIAL SECURITY TAKES CENTER STAGE IN DEFICIT TALKS
By Carl Landler
July 6, 2011
OMAHA – President Obama is set to argue for a far-reaching deficit deal that will force
congressional Democrats to accept unpopular cuts to Social Security. Mr. Obama plans to
announce his proposal at a meeting with House and Senate leaders tomorrow, where he
will push policymakers to take action on controlling the growing federal budget deficit.
After a secret meeting with House Speaker John A. Boehner (Republican-OH) over the
weekend, the president has dramatically raised his sights as Mr. Boehner has signaled a
renewed willingness to bargain on revenues.
While Mr. Boehner has become open to the possibility of ending certain tax breaks and
closing loopholes, Republicans continue to demand that any deficit plan must not contain
new tax increases. “We are not for any proposal that increases taxes,” declared House
Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-VA).
Cuts to Social Security had previously been off the table in negotiations, and some
Democrats have voiced grave alarm at the president's surprising proposal. “Depending on
what they decide to recommend, they may not have Democrats,” Senator Sheldon
Whitehouse, a Rhode Island Democrat, warned in an interview.
The intensifying negotiations between the president and the speaker have created anxiety.
Democrats are fearful that they will be forced to accept an unfair deal that is far too heavily
tilted toward Republican ideas and produces much too little new revenue relative to the
magnitude of the cuts in programs like Social Security.
Senate Democrats have introduced their own opposing plan, which leaves Social Security
completely untouched while proposing sharp cuts at the Pentagon, as well as more than $2
trillion in higher taxes, primarily on families earning more than $1 million per year.
Republicans have emphatically rejected that plan, saying that absolutely any tax increase
would be devastating for a faltering economy already weighed down by a 9.2 percent
unemployment rate. “We want to tackle deficit reduction in a way that doesn’t exacerbate
unemployment,” pronounced Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (Republican-KY).
Republicans also claim that the Democratic plan does too little to confront the ballooning
deficit and out of control federal spending.
Sources indicate that both sides are far from a deal, but that Social Security has become a
point of contention. Both parties have grown deeply distrustful and completely unwilling to
compromise, making a potential deal highly unlikely.
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Fig. 9: Social Security Compassion Low Intensity Frame
CONGRESS CLOSE TO DEAL ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
By Carl Landler
June 28, 2011
OMAHA – Leaders in Congress are close to a deal to reform Social Security, after talks
that have lasted months. With the president and leaders of both parties in Congress
wanting to compromise, lawmakers are coming together on an agreement to address the
future of Social Security.
The proposal being discussed would increase the cap on income subject to the Social
Security tax from $107,000 to $250,000 while also increasing benefits to those affected.
In addition, the plan would further reduce benefits to those who choose to retire before
age 67, the current age required to receive full benefits.
Speaking at the Capitol, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (Republican-VA) said the
deal "ensures that seniors receive the benefits they have earned and that they will
continue to do so for decades to come." Echoing those statements, Senate Majority Whip
Richard Durbin (Democrat-IL) added, "We must pass this bill to protect Social Security
for future generations and retain a financial safety net for their retirement."
Supporters of the plan describe it as a major bill that, if passed, would keep Social
Security financially sound for decades to come while providing benefits to those in need.
“Our seniors deserve security and peace of mind,” said Jennifer Marcom, spokesperson
for the AARP. “They have been paying into this program their whole lives and the
government has an obligation to repay them. This reform will uphold a commitment
while safeguarding Social Security for today's children.”
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Social Security Trust Fund will be
depleted in 2039, at which point the program will no longer be able to pay out full
benefits to retirees. Many claim that if this happens, the vulnerable will not receive the
assistance they need.
The current proposal, which has bipartisan support and has been endorsed by the
president, is an effort to fully finance Social Security and ensure that all seniors receive
full benefits in the future.
37
Fig. 10: Social Security Compassion High Intensity Frame
CONGRESS CLOSE TO DEAL ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM
By Carl Landler
June 28, 2011
OMAHA – Leaders in Congress are close to a deal to reform Social Security, after talks
that have lasted months. With the president and leaders of both parties in Congress
eager to compromise, lawmakers are coming together on an agreement to address the
financial health of Social Security.
The proposal being discussed would increase the cap on income subject to the Social
Security tax from $107,000 to $250,000 while also increasing much needed benefits to
the elderly. In addition, the plan would further reduce benefits to those who choose to
retire before age 67, the current age required to receive full benefits.
Speaking at the Capitol, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (Republican-VA) said the
deal "ensures that at-risk seniors receive the essential benefits they have rightfully
earned and that they will continue to do so for decades to come." Echoing those
statements, Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (Democrat-IL) added, "We must pass
this bill to save Social Security for future generations and safeguard a vital financial
safety net for their retirement."
Supporters of the plan hail it as a landmark that, if passed, would keep Social Security
financially sound for decades to come while providing crucial benefits to those in the
most need. “Our hard-working seniors deserve security and peace of mind,” said
Jennifer Marcom, spokesperson for the AARP. “They have been faithfully paying into
this program their whole lives and the government has a moral obligation to repay
them. This reform will uphold a worthy commitment while safeguarding Social Security
for today's children.”
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Social Security Trust Fund will be
exhausted in 2039, at which point the program will no longer be able to pay out full
benefits to needy retirees. Many fear that if this happens, the truly vulnerable will not
receive the aid they desperately need.
The current proposal, which has genuine bipartisan support and has been endorsed by
the president, is an effort to fully finance Social Security and guarantee that all senior
citizens receive full benefits in the future.
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Opinion Questions
Libya Anger
1. Do you favor or oppose Congress using the War Powers Resolution to require
the President to seek authorization for U.S. military involvement in Libya?
2. Do you favor or oppose U.S. involvement in Libya?
Libya Compassion
1. Do you favor or oppose the United Nations’ establishment of a no-fly zone
over Libya?
2. Do you favor or oppose U.S. involvement in Libya?
Social Security Anger
1. Do you favor or oppose the President’s plan to reduce the deficit, in part,
by cutting Social Security?
2. Do you favor oppose the Republicans’ plan to reduce the deficit without any
new tax increases?
Social Security Compassion
1. Do you favor or oppose the Congressional plan to reform Social Security?
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